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VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Contact Information

Department of Economics
Vanderbilt University
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Education

Doctor of Philosophy, Economics, Vanderbilt University, August 2015 to Present
Master of Arts, Economics, Clemson University, August 2007 to December 2008
Bachelor of Arts, Economics, Clemson University, August 2004 to May 2008

Fields of Research Interest

Labor Economics, Family Economics, Experimental Economics

Teaching Experience

*All at Vanderbilt University

Spring 2019	Intermediate Macroeconomics, Teaching Assistant to Kathleen McKiernan
Summer 2018	Intermediate Microeconomics, Instructor
Spring 2018	Econometrics, Teaching Assistant to Professor Zara Sahakyan
Fall 2017	Latin American Development, Teaching Assistant to Professor Ana Andrade
Spring 2017	Latin American Development, Teaching Assistant to Professor Ana Andrade Game Theory, Teaching Assistant to Professor John Weymark
Fall 2016	Latin American Development, Teaching Assistant to Professor Ana Andrade Development Economics, Teaching Assistant to Federico Gutierrez

Grants, Fellowships, & Awards

2019	Russell Sage Foundation Behavioral Economics Small Grant (\$7,500) GLDI Travel Grant (\$1,000)
2018	Kirk Dornbush Research Assistantship Council of Economic Graduate Students Grant College of Arts & Sciences Travel Grant
2017	Faculty/Graduate Student Collaborative Research Grant (\$5,000) Graduate Summer Language Training Grant (\$5,000)
2016	Kirk Dornbush Summer Research Grant (\$2,500) Data Acquisition Grant (\$7,500) Council of Economic Graduate Students Grant Graduate Summer Language Training Grant

Presentations

Conferences: Economic Science Association- North America (2018), Southern Economics Association (2018), Missouri Valley Economics Association (2018)

Invited Talks: The University of Toledo (2019), Western Illinois University (2019), New York University- Abu Dhabi (2018)

Professional Activities

Session Chair, Southern Economics Association Conference (2018)

Discussant, Missouri Valley Economics Association Conference (2018)

Other Service

Lab Manager, Vanderbilt University Experimental Economics Laboratory (2018 to Present)

Representative, Council of Economic Graduate Students (2015 to 2016)

Research in Progress

Second-Order Beliefs and Gender in the Lab

One plausibly important, but relatively ignored, mechanism for explaining behavior in a variety of economic settings are second-order beliefs— beliefs about other people’s beliefs. Second-order beliefs about gender-specific distributions, in particular, may be important to understanding the mechanisms underlying gender differences in outcomes. In this paper, we develop a methodology to elicit second-order beliefs about the differences between two populations, then apply it to elicit beliefs about the differences between men and women in a lab experiment. We elicit both first- and second-order beliefs about the performance of men and women on a timed math task and an abstract bargaining task. We find that men and women both believe that men score higher on the math task. Participants’ second-order beliefs are distorted— both men and women believe that men’s beliefs favor men *more* than they actually do and believe that women’s beliefs favor men *less* than they actually do. First-order beliefs about bargaining also favor men choosing higher minimum acceptable offers in the Ultimatum game, but second-order beliefs are distorted in the opposite direction. Our methodology can be easily adapted to measure second-order beliefs about the differences between any two populations in any measurable personal characteristic.

Mechanism Performance under Strategy Advice and Sub-Optimal Play:

A School Choice Experiment

We implement a laboratory experiment to study how strategy advice affects participants’ strategy decisions in a school choice game. In the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, strategy advice prompts more participants to choose the dominant strategy of truth-telling. In the Immediate Acceptance (IA) mechanism, strategy advice to implement one of two heuristic strategies that are widely recommended in the field induces participants to choose one of those strategies. We then use our data to perform exploratory analyses on how the variation in the proportion of participants who choose sub-optimal strategies affects mechanism performance. Consistent with the literature, we find that DA outperforms IA in standard efficiency and stability tests. Our advice treatment, in which more participants choose the dominant strategy in DA and more participants choose one of the recommended heuristic strategies in IA, increases the degree to which DA outperforms IA. Next, we consider the welfare of individual participants in the DA versus the IA mechanism. Since our experiment is inter- rather than intra-participant, we do not know a participant’s counter-factual strategy. Instead, we address the issue by developing a new typology of DA strategies that allows us to partially order sub-optimal strategies. Comparing individuals’ welfare under their chosen heuristic strategy in IA to increasingly

irrational strategies in DA shows that DA continues to outperform IA, even under strategies "far" from the theoretically optimal strategies. We find that disadvantaged participants (those with priority at schools ranked low in their preferences) have the most to gain by participating in the DA mechanism rather than the IA mechanism.